Unless you are not Singaporean, you will not have missed how the institution of National Service (military conscription as it is called in Singapore) has been discussed quite a fair bit in recent months. The following lines are my own, highly unstructured and rambling, thoughts on this subject.
WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES (SAF)?
It seems like a silly question – because the obvious (or as we say in Singapore English, or Singlish, ahbutthen!) answer is to defend the state against external threats. I am certainly not about to question that rationale, although how the SAF thereafter is structured to actually defend Singapore is going to be an issue I want to return to later in this post. But what specifically are the scenarios in which we can envisage the SAF being called to fulfill its national mission? I think this question is something that really needs to be seriously discussed before any subsequent discussion on the existence of National Service can be undertaken meaningfully.
Lee Kuan Yew outlined in his memoirs the scenario in which he would, as Prime Minister, would have had to activate the SAF – and it had to do with a scenario in which Singapore’s water supplies, which were in the past heavily dependent on Malaysian sources, had been severed by unknown third parties. Clearly, in his scenario, it would not have been the Malaysian government that severed water supplies, but for a number of reasons too complicated to go into here, the Malaysian government would have been unable or unwilling to re-establish water supplies thereafter. At this point, Lee Kuan Yew admits, he would have no choice but to use the SAF as a leverage to compel the Malaysian government to honour the international agreement between the two states.
In other words, if the SAF needed to go to war to protect Singapore, the casus belli or cause of war would have been the severance of water supplies. In this scenario, the structure of the SAF begins to make sense – a land force component comprising 2PDF whose function is island defence, and 4 manoeuvre combined arms divisions, an air force comprising both air combat as well as heavy air lift capabilities, and a naval force component that included heavy sea lift. If you think through the strategic logic of Lee Kuan Yew’s scenario, therefore, I suspect you would come to the conclusion that the SAF would have had to practice a limited military offensive against Malaysia, impose a temporary military occupation of parts of Malaysian territory, and subsequently use that temporary occupation as a political leverage to compel Malaysia’s government to honour the water agreements.
Here’s the thing, therefore – the first of the two water agreements between Singapore and Malaysia lapsed a few years back, without any angst from the Singapore government. The simple point is that Singapore is moving increasingly towards a self-sufficient potable water policy, utilising desalination and recycling technologies. Water, in other words, is no longer the casus belli of the hypothetical war that the SAF might need to fight!
WHAT IS THE 21st CENTURY PURPOSE OF THE SAF?
I am not going to suggest that the SAF is no longer needed to defend Singapore in the event that Singapore becomes embroiled in a war with another state. Nevertheless, I suggest that it is fundamentally important for us to think through what that imagined war is going to be about, against whom Singapore will be going to war, and thereafter, how that war can be fought with what type of SAF.
So, if this is true, then what is the scenario in which Singapore has to go to war? What is the politics of this imagined war? What is the likely casus belli? Clausewitzian strategic logic tells us that the politics that underpins any war will shape not only the political objectives of the war, but also shape the military instrument that is used to fulfill those political objectives.
In that regard, the SAF’s current structure reflects a different war scenario, a different politics, and a different set of political objectives. The SAF reflects the Lee Kuan Yew scenario, which may no longer apply in 21st Century Singapore. In other words, the 4 manoeuvre combined arms divisions, the heavy air and sea lift capabilities, were necessary in Lee Kuan Yew’s scenario because the SAF would have had to invade and occupy a limited portion of Malaysian territory. But what cause of war today would require the SAF to still invade and impose a limited and temporary occupation of Malaysian territory?
Because the Lee Kuan Yew scenario involved the severance of then-absolutely essential water supplies, it was probably possible to portray an SAF invading and occupying limited portions of Malaysian territory as politically and strategically defensive in nature, even if the type of military operations would have been inherently offensive. Presumably, Singapore could have then justified to the United Nations that this hypothetical war was consonant with UN principles of just war – war as self-defence and last measure.
Maybe, jut maybe, the SAF can envisage other war scenarios today that still compel Singapore to adopt this limited operational offensive capability. Certainly one could use the strategic geography argument – that Singapore lacks strategic depth – to begin to justify such a limited operational offensive capability. But with an air force that is widely regarded as the most modern, most well-equipped and most well-trained in the Southeast Asian region, surely this air power, augmented by an increasingly professional and well-trained naval force component, could have imposed a cordon sanitaire of sorts around Singapore that would have prevented ay enemy forces from being able to bring deadly force to bear on any part of this densely populated and over-crowded island! In other words, surely an artificial and temporary strategic depth can be acquired without the need of ground forces to occupy another country’s territory?
REVISITING CONSCRIPTION – MAKING NATIONAL SERVICE MEANINGFUL
Thus far, the Singapore discussions on National Service do not appear to have addressed the need for military conscription to be continued. It has addressed another issue, namely, how National Service can be made more meaningful.
This second issue, about making National Service more meaningful, is an important issue. And it was heartening, at least to me, that much of the on-line chatter response to Hri Kumar’s suggestion of a defence and security tax on non-citizen residents was pretty dismissive of this suggestion. I remembered one particular response: “Don’t cheapen my service to my nation” was how one netizen responded. I do like some of the ideas that have since been forwarded – in particular the idea that the SAF could do more to match civilian skill-sets with military vocations (although I would also think that this can only be done up to a point!). I am less certain about some of the other suggestions – like giving NSmen priority access to a number of government services, in particular health care, housing and education.
I personally think that the best way to make National Service more meaningful is to not insult the commitment and intelligence of National Servicemen, whether in full-time or reservist (the SAF calls this ‘operationally ready’). The SAF can do better to relate specific activities to broader strategic objectives. I remember one particular month during my National Service where I was over a 3-week period deployed to support three different military exercises, and because the exercises were conducted in the same training area albeit with different companies, it was for me utterly meaningless; by week 2, I was merely going through the motions, doing the barest minimum to not piss off the captain I was attached to for the duration of the exercise. Many years later, I found out that that three week period coincided with a major military exercise involving pretty much all of the Singapore Army. I wondered then if my motivation during the three-week period would have been better had I been told that those three weeks, as painful as they were, were part of a much larger strategic enterprise. Would I have been more committed to training seriously?
My suspicion is that I probably would have been more committed, I would have taken the training a little more seriously. Which brings me back to my point about not insulting the intelligence of the SAF’s NSmen. I think the best way to make National Service a more meaningful experience is to be up front with the NSmen, tell them specifically what they are doing and more importantly why they are doing it, and to avoid the banal platitudes of “defending Singapore”. When a battalion is going out for what appears to the soldiers as just another bog-standard training exercise, tell them instead that this is not a normal bog-standard exercise, but that it is part of a larger exercise involving other component elements of the SAF. Maybe this makes the specific exercise thereafter more meaningful for the soldiers.
REVISITING THE NECESSITY OF NATIONAL SERVICE
But I also want to come back to this point about the need to maintain conscription. If my preceding analysis is correct, then maybe Singapore no longer needs National Service. If the wars the SAF is likely to fight in no longer require the temporary occupation of another country’s territory, then maybe the SAF no longer needs to maintain such a large land force component. Maybe the Singapore Army no longer needs 4 manoeuvre combined arms divisions. Maybe all the Singapore Army hereafter needs is sufficient soldiers (volunteers) to perform island defence against potential enemy invasion. As my friend and colleague, Professor Paul Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College has argued, the SAF will need to maintain a seriously professional and well-trained air force and navy, but guess what, it seems like the current air force and navy are already professional and well-trained!
There is another argument to support the abandonment of conscription. It is an argument that taps into the Revolutions in Military Affairs thesis that was so popular in the late 1990s through to the early 2000s. The RMA, as most scholars argued, was never going to be easy: it demanded very high technological competencies and technical skill-sets of soldiers, it was doctrinally sophisticated which therefore demanded soldiers who were very well-trained and well-educated (and this, by the way, was why these scholars concluded that conscript-based armed forces would not be able to do the RMA).
In the final analysis, I recognise that these thoughts are potentially very controversial, and that I am possibly stirring up a hornet’s nest. But I believe these are issues that ought to be discussed alongside the existing discussion about the meaningfulness of National Service.
Thanks for writing this; personally, I feel conflicted about NS. Am a military nut, I really enjoyed some parts of NS. But parts of it turned me off so much that I stopped myself from signing on. An entirely professionalised SAF could make it more nimble, but I am also concerned about the possible reduction in transparency.
Sze Yong, I guess I would need to press you a bit on what you mean by the “possible reduction in transparency”.
Sorry, took so long to reply. I was very taken aback when I heard about 2WO Poh Eng Ann’s death. The inappropriate initiation games, which included the F-5 tunnel crawl, was to me an example of what could possibly go wrong in an all-regular force. An organisation made up purely of regulars will tend to be more close-knit and effective, but also conversely have a higher threshold for whistle-blowing. A NSF, on the other hand, has nothing to lose, as his career is not at stake. This transparency can be seen in other organisations. All else being equal, an organisation with a mixture of volunteers and paid workers will likely have a more open and accountable environment. That’s why I feel conflicted about NS 😦
SzeYong, a difficult issue indeed. There is something to be said about greater public scrutiny and accountability, but I don’t think this is a function of the type of organisation; rather, I suspect it is a function of the type of society in which the particular organisation resides. It is up to that society to demand greater public scrutiny and accountability, to demand greater transparency
Correct me if I’m wrong, but your statement that a powerful airforce and navy can effectively protect Singapore is premised on the assumption that these forces can be brought to bear.
In a hypothetical conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, this assumption would not be valid. Malaysian forces can effectively position assets within Malaysia itself and target our air and naval bases. We are within mortar range, not to speak of tube or rocket artillery, all of which Malaysia possesses. To effectively create a ‘protective bubble’ for our vaunted air assets to take off, the army needs to deny Malaysian forces within Malaysia itself, hence there still is a need for a forward defense strategy.
Secondly, I certainly agree that NS can be made more meaningful– but the specific example you raised may not be the best one. We all understand that the need for operational security. Should we train our soldiers to expect to understand our casus belli,every moral and legal argument, before they agree to fight? Or should we train them to respond quickly and neutralize the threat and then explain the rationale? I propose that the latter is the correct answer.
Thirdly, having trained both with a professional military and the SAF, I am proud to say that our conscript soldiers are far more able to implement the RMA than you think. Assertions that the RMA preclude conscripted soldiers clearly have their mental models of conscription (and conscripted soldiers) which are invalid in this day and age.
In terms of education, maturity and sophistication, our soldiers are better than the professional soldiers of many other armed forces. Other armed forces that illustrate this phenomenon include Switzerland and Israel, where the population is highly educated.
Finally, I am glad that we agree that Conscription, should it be necessary, must be seen as a sacred duty and should not be cheapened. How we recognise the sacrifices of those who do their duty without resorting to extrinsic motivation is a challenge that NS policy makers face every day. Do you have your own suggestions on how we can do this? 🙂
Edwin, many thanks for your very insightful comments, although I have to say I don’t think I would agree with you.
Your first comment is fair enough, although as it stands, Malaysian artillery is typically deployed quite some distance away from Singapore on a day-to-day basis. Pervasive monitoring of the hypothetical cordon sanitaire I would imagine ought to be sufficient to maintain this; once said artillery gets positioned within range of Singapore, then all bets are off. That being said, in a hypothetical situation where this artillery is already within range of Singapore, then what value does a land force component provide to preventing such artillery attacks on Singapore?
Furthermore, wars and armed conflicts don’t just break out all of a sudden; there is a gestation period during which the political relationship begins to break down, and assuming that the argument is over something that either side places tremendous value on, then the use of force becomes an increasingly attractive option. Granted, there is always the possibility of intelligence failure, that one side will misread the signs from the other and through hubris absolutely rule out the probability of armed conflict. Once again, given Singapore’s geostrategic conditions, I am still struggling to figure out what such a large land force component can do to prevent deadly fire from reaching our shores.
Your second point is something I find rather harder to address, because I definitely see your point about the need for operational security. That being said, rationales inevitably will have to be explained to every soldier, I believe. In an age where anybody with a camera phone and internet connectivity is a potential news reporter, a single soldier who does not understand the rationale and politics that underpins a war can undertake actions that can undermine the strategic success of the state at war. All it takes is one person to capture images of that wrongful act, upload it on an international news medium, and Singapore’s moral grounding in international law and international opinion might be fatally weakened. You no doubt remember the maid and the backpack incident; now imagine something worse happening, this time in a war.
Your third point is probably the hardest for me to counter. I have to differ to other judgements about the current state of National Service, since I have not been involved in military training for almost a decade now. My point about conscription and the increasing complexity of operational doctrines and concepts is based almost entirely on the judgements of defence scholars far more accomplished and distinguished than I can ever be. I know, it sounds like the logical fallacy of appealing to authority; nevertheless I think a logical case can be made for it. Training is one thing – training exercises are highly scripted, things are not supposed to go wrong in training exercises, and the fog and friction of war is almost surely kept to a minimum. Now imagine a war situation – soldiers are tired, fatigued, desperately sleep-deprived, fear and anger coursing through their veins in equal measure. Under those circumstances, I start to have doubts that their training necessarily sees them through.
Training, in its essence, I believe is about gaining muscle memory, about developing almost second instincts. When I was in NS, the ‘semulah’ (hope I spelt it correctly) was the one I hated more than anything else. Today with the benefit of hindsight, I recognise its absolute necessity. Repetition develops those muscle memories and second instincts. I am still not entirely sure that conscripted military service provides soldiers with enough ‘semulah’ time to properly develop those muscle memories and second instincts.
Finally, suggestions? Wow! Not wanting to sound like I am copping out, but if I had the answers to that question … Seriously, I don’t know what the answer is; I wish I could say I am beginning to find an answer, but that would not be truthful.
Once again, many thanks for your comments. My colleagues and I hope to see more from you in our future posts.
Just thinking if the artillery is in place, and they indeed fired. Won’t they cripple the Air force and Navy first? And personally I don’t think even a effective Air force or Navy could stop a large land force. Is like Rock, Paper Scissors, right? If you only have two option and i have three, won’t the possibility of me winning is higher? or the saying putting all the eggs in one basket.
Emphasising the hypothetical scenario,
Would it be casus belli if Malaysian forces positioned their artillery within range of our critical assets? I posit that while it is a highly provocative move, we would not go to war just to destroy those assets. What if they just positioned air defence artillery, which could be construed as a purely defensive move but which would nonetheless deny our aircraft from taking off?
One possible purpose of the land force component, if used in a forward defence scenario, would force these artillery out of range once hostilities started, and allow us to employ the aerial dimension to support subsequent operations. Many other possible scenarios may also require the use of the military in offensive operations.
Re: maid and backpack, I definitely see your point. But revealing too much information is detrimental as well– the IDF having to call off an operation due to 1 soldier leaking on facebook is a case in point:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/idf-calls-off-west-bank-raid-due-to-facebook-leak-1.264065
Ultimately, commanders have to make the call.
Training is, to a certain extent about muscle memory– which is why it is important that we continue to have 2 years to train our soldiers. But the RMA goes beyond training. It is fundamentally about information warfare and the use of technology, which our educated soldiers are more than well prepared by their environment and education to adopt. They are digital natives.
While acknowledging the expertise of defence scholars, I am not sure what their mental model of a conscript soldier is. Certainly, the present-day singapore soldier is very different from the conscript of yester-year.
Your posts are certainly thought-provoking and I look forward to many more interesting discussions!
Presumably, in this scenario, relations between the two countries will have sunk to the point where the positioning of said artillery this close to Singapore will then be seen as a red line – at which point, I suspect the RSAF will kick into action to undertake concurrently SEAD (to allow RSAF sorties to carry on unimpeded) as well as ground strikes against any artillery that can bring deadly fire to bear on Singapore.
Also, on the issue of being open with soldiers, I do not suggest that operational plans have to be divulged ahead of time – but certainly, while in peace-time training, I believe that more can be shared with NSFs and NSmen with regards to the strategic purposes of specific training exercises.
Many thanks for your vote of confidence – and my colleagues and I look forward to more similar exchanges of views in the future. This is precisely what we have been hoping for when we started this blog!
Having looked at the literature on mandatory military service, it’s very clear that scholars strongly believed conscripts would be of limited use from the 1970s onwards. It was clear that the main military argument against conscripts was their inability to handle increasingly technically complicated and technologically advanced equipment. The RMA would require a soldier to dedicate one’s life to achieve proficiency with new weapon systems. Some went even further predicting that nuclear weapons would make conventional forces redundant.
That said, while these observations had logical basis, the reality on the ground showed change was in reality less abrupt, and more gradual, if not downright glacial. The scholars didn’t really get it right, but it’s always 50/50 with us :). Right until the end of the Cold War, conscripts were still envisaged to be, bluntly put, cannon fodder providing the bulk of the military force, and therefore still at least quantitatively useful. Because conscripts were never tested in a large-scale war (thank God there wasn’t WWIII) there’s no actual qualitative assessment of their ability. As such, the impression that conscripts are lousy rests largely of assumptions and theorising about the future of war.
This still hasn’t changed. This difficulty in assessment is further complicated in the present day by two things. First, because defence policies and budgets vary, no two militaries are alike. This is especially so in the current era of the “postmodern” military where its raison d’etre is no longer strictly “defence” in its traditional sense. Second, and related to the first observation, is the the practical shape conscription takes varies greatly. The wide variance in length of mandatory service (anywhere between 4 months to 3 years in developed countries with conscription) already suggests this. It’s therefore impossible to generalise “quality” because each conscription system is “fit for purpose,” with the purpose in each country varying tremendously. There’s no absolute measure of quality.
What can be said of Singapore’s NS is that it is a system that is that it is fit for Singapore’s current defence purpose. It generates NSmen who have been trained to a very high level so that the SAF has a substantive force of well-trained combatants. This, of course, doesn’t necessarily translate to combat effectiveness as Bernard pointed out. But perhaps determining that is a moot point because that’s impossible to prospectively measure, and more importantly, the true military value of NS is to provide for a SAF that is convincingly credible so that it can be a successful deterrent force. Whether it’s really as good as it looks is something I hope we’ll never have to find out.
Fair enough, except I still don’t see how having a conscript-based large land force component is still going to solve the problem that your scenario poses.
Dear Prof Loo,
thanks for starting this useful thread. Wish we had this when I was still in SAFTI. I hope the following provides avenues for fruitful discussion. I must admit I am very skeptical about the idea of forgoing NS. Am I right in thinking you are the first notable academic to voice this openly?
1) Apart from a large ground presence, can we overcome a Hezbollah vs Israel (2006) type scenario? Low-tech weapons housed in residential districts just across the border might make firepower solutions tricky, especially if we intend to ask for third party help to reach an acceptable end-state. Invade and clear opens up a can of worms, but since the initiative lies with such aggressors, do we have a choice?
2) Is the following distinction I make between forward defence and an RMA blitz valid?
A blitz (knockout blow in round one as Mathias Yao put it) might be our only hope if timely favorable third party intervention is not expected. It would seem prudent however, to have enough men to hold captured ground (in rotation?) and wait for help should a blitz stall. If possible, I would think we should train to do both as the enemy has a say in how things unfold. Numerical advantage can enable a blitz as much firepower and swift movement can. While numbers are no guarantee of victory, lack of numbers seem to offer fewer options.
3) Apart from RMA-related relative strengths, Singapore has also tried to ensure that it would enjoy a favourable balance of power in any situation. Should academia not give more attention to scenarios other than one-on-one contests with a neighbor that has gone rogue?
4) Any thoughts on what force structure we would need if we were to fight alongside our neighbors in a wider war? What are the variety of scenarios we should consider?
5) I like your cordon sanitaire idea, which might be imperative if we were involved on multiple fronts, though I believe this is more practicable along our southern borders. Could we do with something less than a multi-division army in a two-front war? Any thoughts on Schlieffen-like options?
6) Once we abolish NS, can we restart it if we need to? E.g. regime change or breakdown in a previously friendly neighboring state?
7) Not adopting NS is one thing, but would abolition not signal that defence was no longer every Singaporean’s business?
8) Could Singapore find itself in a no-win situation? Does Singapore’s inherent weaknesses restrict it to handling less-than-worst-case scenarios?
I should state that I have every confidence war will not break out between Singapore and its current immediate neighbors, just unsure about neighbors that might take their place.
Apart from academic discussion, would you be interested in exchanging views and insights on military education?
Best Rgds,
Chye Guan (formerly MSB)
Chye Guan
wow! Many things to address in this, so bear with me …
Scenario One: the terrorist organisation scenario is a potentially problematic one. But even then, the tactical-operational and strategic challenges posed by having to operate against a well-hidden terrorist organisation operating in a dense and non-combatant-heavy urban environment will almost certainly require a land force component – and it might therefore constitute a deal-breaker for my no-NS proposition. That being said, a land force operating in this kind of terrain is going to sustain very heavy losses, almost certainly, and this is something that Singapore will have to consider. Furthermore, given that such a terrorist organisation operating in this urban terrain would be violating the sovereignty of the neighbouring state, this will almost certainly begin to put tremendous international legal pressure on this state to ‘do something’ about the problem, and quite possibly on our behalf.
Scenario Two: I don’t see how holding ground against a state-centric attack is necessary, and I certainly don’t see how numbers can facilitate a blitz-style assault, unless we are talking about human waves ala the Chinese ‘volunteers’ during the Korean War. Even then, the whole point of a blitz would be to move men and material at very quick pace deep into the enemy’s depth, which surely necessitates strategic heavy lift. Finally, surely this ‘blitz’ can be achieved through the air domain, through the imposition of a cordon sanitaire that prevents the enemy from moving military capabilities to positions where Singapore comes within range of indirect fire.
Scenario Three: in the event that it is not a one-on-one, but a two-on-one scenario, then surely all the more a numerically and technologically dominant air and naval power becomes even more imperative?
Scenario Four: My proposition is inspired by Corbett’s vision of maritime power for the British – that Britain did not need to maintain a large land force component, but by placing emphasis on an operationally and strategically dominant naval force, it can translate that naval dominance thereafter into the capacity to support its continental allies at a time and place of their choosing, allowing for the greatest potential strategic effect of this employment of an admittedly limited land power. Surely the same can apply in the scenario of a coalition campaign.
On the application of a cordon sanitaire, surely this can be done in both the land and maritime domains, since pervasive and precise sensing (and the attendant early warning it enhances) can render the land domain almost as transparent as the maritime domain.
Your final points I would suggest really need to first ask a more fundamental question, involving the politics of this hypothetical future war. Clausewitz tells us that every war is politically different, and this subsequently requires a tailored military response. If that is correct, then I think we should be asking if those scenarios you envisage really require a large land force component at all. Land forces are useful to occupy terrain against the enemy, not so much for tactical and operational considerations (at least, in my opinion, not any more), but more for the strategic-political reasons of putting pressure on the other state to do something to ameliorate Singapore’s security problem at the moment.
Quick and very substantive response much appreciated sir. As there are so many worthwhile avenues to pursue further discussion, hopefully with others joining in, would you mind if I pursue one scenario at a time? I am hoping for a long-term meaningful exchange but do not wish to be imposing on you as you must have more pressing things to attend to.
Scenario One:
I do think we must be prepared for less-than-worse-case scenarios, as launching a cross-border invasion where an iron-dome or cordon sanitaire solution would do could end up turning us into an Israel and end life as we know it anyway. It could even provide our adversary with the means to draw in third party intervention on their side or lead to implosion as Singaporean society collapses under the strain of war. This would be a most-regrettable case of self-inflicted disaster. Therefore, I am all for enhancing capabilities that would make invade-and-hold unnecessary.
On the other hand, the Hezbollah example worries me immensely because it means a well-considered strategy launched by a rag-tag force could force us to risk a pyrrhic victory in preference over guaranteed disaster. Some of our factories within sight of our northern border house gases that will kill thousands in minutes, even before people can smell them. They are not hardened against stray mortar rounds. A rational opponent might not try this as Johor will doubtless be affected. One bent on total war would probably relish the prospect.
Like you, I think it imperative to stop such scenarios from occurring in the first place, perhaps shoring up a collapsing neighbor, tricky though this might be. Far better to let our neighbor deal with the problem, but if Johor has turned into something akin to southern Lebanon, this might not be possible. Worst still, anything a guerilla force can do, a better-equipped conventional enemy can copy if it trained well. So, state collapse is not the only scenario that requires us to be able to put forward defence into action quickly. Regime change could leave a new unfriendly neighbor with the option of forcing us to accept the cost and risks of invading it. I am thus very glad that active diplomacy has given us the ability to complicate any future adversary’s plans, providing a level of deterrence against plans that counted on Singapore fighting on its own. This not only helps lower risks of conflict but might also reduce the risk of pursuing forward defence if and when necessary.
We are relatively secure not because we can deal with scenario one type challenges but because they are not likely to occur as yet. I applaud those that work tirelessly on the diplomatic front to shore up this first line of defence and hope that one day, we will approach the kind of intra-regional security western Europe enjoys. Till then, would it not be prudent to enhance both our ability to prosecute invade-and-hold missions and capabilities that will raise the threshold for launching such missions (e.g. cordon sanitaire)?
Best Rgds,
Chye Guan
Wow, I came to the party late!
I think the defence angle has been amply explored here so I won’t go into that. The only thing I’d like to add is from a manpower point of view, doing away with conscription will require a fundamental re-think of how the SAF is structured. I do not think it’ll be able to recruit an all-volunteer force based on a “traditional” military structure, even if its doctrine is progressive. The reason is it’ll be extremely difficult to recruit the junior ranks which are currently overwhelmingly staffed by conscripts. It’s the whole “PMET” and low-skilled workers challenge, where if Singaporeans now aspire for a mid-level entry into the workplace hierarchy, who’s going to sign on as a private? If the SAF was to shift to an AVF, it’ll be struck by the same manpower challenges the private sector faces. In fact, it probably will be worse as recruiting foreigners will not be an option. Taiwan’s plan to shift fully to an AVF has been challenging because of problems in recruiting volunteers.
I’d like to offer two other quick observations on the domestic politics of NS:
1. Like war, NS is ultimately a political construct. So, its continuation or end hinges as much as the other elements of politics outside the military realm. In other words, even if it doesn’t really make military sense, it may still continue for other reasons. Or, it may still continue simply because of political inertia. The conscription debate in Western Europe began in the early 1970s which from the start highlighted the practical illogic of maintaining a mass army of conscripts. Yet it was only in the mid-1990s that conscription began to finally end on the continent. Germany only did away with it in 2011, even though some had identified it as being at the forefront of the debates in the early 1970s. The point here is political will to change is vital to end any institution that is as deeply entrenched in society as conscription is. There wasn’t any in W. Europe till the 90s so it continued there. That said, the moment there is sufficient will, conscription can end quite quickly. Taiwan’s a good example, though not a perfect one. Until NS rises to the top tier of the country’s political agenda, I don’t see a dismantling of the institution any time soon.
2. Military service has historically been a key form of political participation and expression. Sure, this is an observation made of a different era, but conscription still has political value to its participants. Those who are obligated to serve the state have enhanced political agency and legitimacy, if only because they’ve “paid their dues.” In Singapore, we see various political claims made simply because NS was served. The most noticeable one is NS is a marker of “Singaporean-ness” in the whole Singapore-foreigner debate. NS in this sense grants Singaporeans more political power and has been used to legitimise opposition to certain government policies. I’m unsure if Singaporeans would want to surrender this at this point in time.
Shu,
In fact, I personally see your second observation as the only plausible justification for the retention of conscription. But if that is the case, then why restrict this ‘Singaporean’ experience to only the men? As I have argued before, why can’t we extend this experience to the women as well? Furthermore, conscription does not then have to remain restricted to the security services, but can surely encompass other facets of national life as well.
Bernard,
I think the political leverage NS gives citizens is something that’s recognised and appreciated, but I am doubtful people will actively seek it, unlike in the past. Marginalised communities have protested their exclusion from the draft because they equated that with exclusion from political participation and a denial of their rights. That era, however, is probably over.
There are still groups that lobby for the expansion of NS to include other groups, but it has less to do with political rights and more to do with equality. For instance, every few years, the inclusion of females in NS will inevitably be debated. But I think they are the minority. I think many females are quite happy they don’t have to do NS.
Change will only therefore come if the gov’t mandates it. But this is unlikely. Despite all the rhetoric about nation-building, the gov’t stated policy is it only conscripts individuals if there’s a functional need to do so for defence as they recognise it imposes a huge cost on those who serve. “Nation building” is of secondary importance, even if it’s a nice outcome. I suppose by their calculations Singapore’s defence needs are still sufficiently met through the conscription of male Singaporeans and second generation Singaporeans. There’s no need for anyone else.
Many others, you and me both, think otherwise. Even some MPs too. But until the government prioritises nation-building as much as defence, I don’t think it’ll happen.
The larger issue, of course, is whether people are willing to make this a political priority and lobby for change to whatever end they want. If not, then although sound arguments for the need for NS to be modified can be made, political inertia will ensure the institution continues, as was the experience in W. Europe for many decades.
[…] Revisiting Military Conscription (aka National Service) in Singapore […]
May I just ask in which memoir did Mr Lee state that “outlined in his memoirs the scenario…had to activate the SAF…Singapore’s water supplies…severed by unknown third parties”?
I wanted to put that point into an essay I’m currently doing and I can’t find a reference for it, thanks!
It’s time to abolish NS or professionalize the SAF.
http://renounce-sg.blogspot.com/2014/12/national-service-defaulter-statistics.html
[…] protect Singapore, the … cause of war would have been the severance of water supplies,” Loo wrote in a blog post citing Lee’s […]