Japanese soldier found on Guam many years after WWII

Another very interesting piece, also from the BBC, which can be accessed here. It is about a Japanese soldier who had survived on the island of Guam for years after the end of World War Two.

It reminds me of an article I published at the Journal of Strategic Studies (April 2009, VOlume 32, No. 2), entitled “Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military Affairs”, in which I argued that if war is a clash of wills (see Clausewitz), victory in war comes when the opponent decides to give up. Battles are decisive inasmuch as they bring about this collapse of the opponent’s will to resist. But will can be a difficult thing to understand. This story of a Japanese soldier found in the jungles of Guam many years after the end of the war resonates with the argument I made. Indeed, many American soldiers fighting in the Pacific in World War Two often could not get their heads around the refusal of their Japanese opponents to surrender, even though it was patently obvious (at least to American soldiers) that the Japanese had already lost specific battles.

Entering the minds of snipers

A very interesting piece, courtesy of the BBC, which can be accessed here. It shows snipers as very ordinary humans, who tend to think of the people they have killed as human beings (rather than dehumanising them as animals or machines).

This piece brings out a whole range of issues. SLA Marshall’s Men Under Fire – which argued that most soldiers never discharge their weapons they way they were trained to do, and that most soldiers can go through entire wars without ever knowing that they actually killed an enemy combatant – comes immediately to mind. The portrayal of the Somalis in the film Blackhawk Down, which was criticised by some scholars, as nameless masses also comes to mind.

Indonesia’s quest for an enhanced submarine capability, and things that go bump underwater

Associate Research Fellow Collin Koh pens this Diplomat article on Indonesian Navy’s (TNI-AL) attempt to “catch up” with the rest of the region in subsurface defence capabilities. Collin argues that despite the acquisition of three Type 209 1,400-ton diesel-electric submarines from South Korea, the capability that TNI-AL can derive from the new submarines is probably no better than the platforms other regional navies have deployed or are acquiring.

However, Collin warns that this development still presents serious implications for regional defence relations. The Asia-Pacific’s tight, geographical underwater terrain and heavy commercial traffic poses considerable challenges for less experienced submarine operators. Compounding this issue is the scarcity of submarine rescue services, particularly in the immediate waters of Southeast Asia. Might the proliferation of submarines eventuate in a fender bender in the depths, with grave political consequences?

More on the modernisation of the Chinese military

An interesting analysis from RUSI, courtesy of the BBC. The analysis suggests an increasingly powerful PLA (no quarrels with that!), and one that can increasingly challenge the US, at least within the vicinity of China’s identified second island chain. Not sure I agree with the analysis. As I have argued before in earlier posts, I believe the Chinese military has serious qualitative and technological problems to overcome before it can seriously challenge the US in the Asia Pacific.

A case study on the nature of strategy

An interesting comment from The National Interest, which can be accessed here.

Colin Gray defined strategy as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose.” Grant Hammond defined strategy as the harmonisation of power and purpose. Implicit in these definitions – both happen to be my particular favourites – is the recognition that the milieu of strategy involves at least two very different sets of actors.

There is the political actor – especially important in conditions of civilian mastery over the military, but also important in situations where the political-military relationship is much murkier. The political actor occupies the realm of purpose, because all military action is supposed to be purposive. Next, there is the military actor, who tends to occupy the realm of power. Without purpose, that power is meaningless, the act of killing in war no different from that of murder. A soldier who kills the enemy in war is feted as a hero; that same soldier who engages in an act of random killing outside the context of war becomes a murderer.

Both sets of actors are very different, sociologically, psychologically … You can include any number of other aspects here. They speak very different languages, their respective world-views fundamentally different. Somehow, both of them will have to be able to understand one another, and factor each other’s interests and considerations and world-views into their own calculations. Strategy, if this process of harmonisation is done right, is what emerges.

Today, the world of strategy is further complicated by other actors that have entered into this world – news organisations, interest groups, international organisations, non-governmental organisations … again, the list can go on, depending on the imaginativeness of the individual. But the fundamental prerequisite remains – unless and until all these disparate actors learn how to talk to one another, understand one another, and factor everybody’s interests and considerations into their own respective calculations, strategy is not going to emerge.

And in times of conflict and war, the absence of strategy is that sufficient condition for political disaster.

Philippine naval developments

2 posts in one day!

Something from colleague, Collin Koh, who had a commentary published with The Diplomat. As Collin argues, “while it takes years to build up a credible defense capacity, a crisis in the South China Sea could literally happen overnight. Yet without the requisite military capacity in place, there’s virtually nothing that the Philippines could do …”

At least there is some fairly hard-headed strategic analysis regarding strategic challenges and requirements on the one hand and military capabilities on the other that underpins the Philippine decision. I would argue that too much of Southeast Asian military acquisitions are predicated on toys for boys, and therefore often lack any genuine strategic rationale whatsoever!

Wastage in defence spending

A damning article from forbes.com, which can be accessed here.

It seems to me the essential problem is in the trade-off between getting ‘the best’ as opposed to getting ‘the good enough’. And I think a contributing element to this trade-off is the increasing concern over force protection. Hence modern combat systems have to be all bells and whistles, gold-plating gone insane. Of course we should not send our soldiers into harm’s way without ensuring that they have the best possible equipment, that they go in with minimum risks of bodily harm. But, first of all, it is ‘harm’s way’, which means soldiers always go into places where others would not. It is a very high-risk profession, always has been, always will be. Second, the ‘best possible’ is not always the ‘absolute best’. One is achievable within the resource constraints we face, the other is just idle day-dreaming.

So, while the forbes article focuses on the United States, it is nevertheless a cautionary tale for every other armed forces!

Japan’s F-35 order and its implications for European combat aircraft

Richard Bitzinger argues that the European defence industry may be losing the Asian market. Europe’s combat aircraft manufacturers, in losing a potential sale to Japan, could see their future sales to Asia evaporate completely. This could leave the United States in an unassailable position as the world’s predominant fighter aircraft producer. His commentary can be accessed here. He may be my colleague, and I may be therefore biased, but I dare say definitely worth a read!

Chinese navy extending its reach?

Interesting read, courtesy of The Diplomat. I expect some histrionics to come out of this fairly soon. Sigh … I know the Chinese navy is modernising and expanding the extent of its combat capabilities, but I still think there are sufficient qualitative questions to be asked of the Chinese navy. Combat platforms alone do not confer combat effectiveness.

Increasing weapons costs and structural disarmament? A case study of the F-22

brilliant article here from wired.com. Focusing on the recent roll-out of the final F-22 to be built, it shows how one can calculate cost of weapons platforms or systems. In the process, it also demonstrates the difficulty in pinning down our policy-makers over the strategic choices they make in defence expenditure and acquisition. The F-22 can cost, depending on the method you use to calculate it, anything between USD137 million to USD678 million. I tend towards the latter figure. Oh by the way, these figures don’t necessarily include the costs of mid-life enhancements and refurbishments either!